In this paper, we demonstrate a realistic variant of wireless Evil Twins (ETs) for launching device to device (D2D) attacks over the network, particularly for
softwares. Tang et al. [7] utilises Received Signal Strength Indicators (RSSI) to catch an ET. However, this approach is only for stabilised APs, and can not detect an ET from softwares or mobile devices. Unfortunately, no such technique exists which can effectively and efficiently detect a wireless AP as an ET (launched either through a hardware, software, or mobile phone) before associating with it.
In this paper, we present a practical approach to conduct D2D attack in the network using ETs. D2D communication is defined as the establishment of link between devices using communication channels (wired or wireless) [21] .
Here, we consider the channel to be wireless. We define D2D attack as an exploit where one device (A) launches a malicious activity on another device
Attack Scenario
The steps used to launch the attack are as follows:
• We introduce an ET of "CSE" with the captive portal similar to the original one by using Coovachilli [8] , hostapd [9] and Easyhotspot [10] . Coovachilli serves as an access controller for the ET. It diverts the client to the fake captive portal page by blocking the wireless traffic. Hostapd performs the function of spoofing and broadcasting the beacon frames for the ET. We spoof SSID and BSSID of the ET to make it similar to "CSE". Easyhotspot is used to customise the captive portal provided by Coovachilli to look exactly similar to that of "CSE". Hence, the users do not get suspicious of the portal page received on getting connected to an ET of "CSE".
• An ET is placed at a location that provides a higher signal strength than the existing genuine AP. We transmit deauthentication frames for the legitimate AP to disconnect the users from it. Thus, the Android users will be connected directly to the fake AP.
• As soon as the device gets connected to the ET, it gives a notification of "Sign into the network" on the user device, similar to the genuine one.
Thus, the user does not get suspicious and clicks on it.
• On clicking the notification, the user is redirected to the maliciously spoofed captive portal page wherein users provide their username and password. When they click on the submit button, the intent V gets launched on the device. As soon as V is launched, the ET disappears from the network. As the attack launches a service, the user remains unaware that anything fishy has happened on his device, and subsequently gets connected to the legitimate AP. Thus, an ET creeps in the network, harms the device, and vanishes without leaving any traces behind. The attack can prove extremely dangerous for the user, if the service opens a port secretly. The malicious service can either execute netstat command, or read /proc/<pid>/net/tcp file to identify open ports on the device (we assume that the ports are bind to local IP 1 address), and further launch attacks such as information theft, malware installation, remote control, etc [11] . Notably, no special permissions are required to scan the ports on the device [11] . Thus, the impact of this attack can be dangerous for the user.
• Additionally, we steal the username and password entered by the user.
This can be misused to get illegitimate access to the network.
Listing 1: Code snippet for launching an activity or service of an app on Android device using ET <a href="intent://scan/#Intent; scheme=my.special.scheme.V; package=com.example.vineeta.
U;end"> <input name="accept" type="button" value="LOGIN" style="cursor:pointer;"></a>
Listing 1 displays the code for launching the service V of the app U installed on the device using the fake captive portal page of an ET. In Listing 1, the tag <input name="accept" type="button" value="LOGIN" style="cursor:pointer;"> denotes the HTML (Hypertext Markup Language) code of the LOGIN button on the portal page. The HTML tag <a> preceding the code of the LOGIN button explains that a link opens on clicking that button. However, in place of the link, the attacker maliciously invokes a service by launching an intent. Intents are used in Android for inter-component communication among apps [12] . The components of an app can summon other components of the same or different apps using Intents. The code intent://scan/#Intent;scheme=my.special.scheme.V; package=com. example.vineeta.U; shows that the intent will invoke the service V of the app U (containing package name as com.example.vineeta.U) supporting the scheme my.special.scheme.V. Package name uniquely identifies an app on 1 IP address stands for Internet Protocol address the device, and scheme defines the type of the data handled by the intent [12] .
Scheme can be either pre-defined (such as images, videos, etc.), or customdefined (such as mail) [12] . Thus, as the user clicks on the LOGIN button of the fake portal page, the malicious service gets launched on his device.
Evil Twin of CSE Client Device <a href="intent://scan/#Intent; scheme=my.special.scheme; package=com.example.vineeta. androidapktransferserver;end"> <input name="accept" type="button" value="LOGIN" style="cursor:pointer;"></a> Since captive portal is a web page which authenticates and accounts the activities of the user in a network, many web based attacks can be launched through the portal. Xia et al. [13] have demonstrated the launch of session hijacking attack through captive portal. In this attack, the attacker transmits deauthentication frames to disconnect the genuine user from the network, and mimics the MAC (Media Access Control) address and DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) network configuration of the user. Thus, the attacker acts as a valid user in the network by hijacking the session. Adrian et al. [14] launch browser history stealing attack through captive portal. The attacker modifies the portal page by including a large number of image references with links. The page checks the links against the persistent cookies database of the user's device, and logs the cookies which are associated to the links in the database. However, this attack requires a huge DNS (Domain name System) lookup time (which can make a user suspicious), and a large database of websites against which the cookies of the users are checked. Chen et al. [15] proposes a MITM attack using ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) spoofing to bypass the captive portal, and access Internet without getting authenticated. The attacker locates itself between authenticated client and AP, and conduct IP masquerading to access Internet.
A lot of ET attacks have also been proposed in the literature. Karma attack [16] sniffs the probe request of the client, and on the basis of requested parameters, automatically creates an AP on the fly. Catch-All-Evil-Twin attack [17] creates multiple ETs for a single SSID with all types of security configurations. DNS Spoofing [18] and SSL Stripping [19] (such as open a port). Notably, all attack steps are performed before the relay of network traffic, and the attacker needs not to be present in the network for a long time. As soon as the device gets infected, attacker can simply switch the ET off, and allow the user to connect to the genuine AP. So, tracking the ET is extremely challenging. Therefore, a technique is required to scan for ETs in a network before the establishment of connection between the ET and the device.
Preliminaries
In this section, we explain beacon frame components of APs which contribute in ET detection, define D2D attacks on Android, and classify ETs and ET attack scenarios in three categories on the basis of ecosystem and the position of the ET in the network, respectively. 
Beacon Frame Components
Beacon frame is a management frame transmitted by an AP for broadcasting its capabilities to client devices in a network. Beacon frame body encloses information about the properties of the AP. It includes mandatory and optional fields of fixed and variable lengths. The variable length fields are known as Information Elements (IEs) [20] . In this paper, we are employing beacon frame fingerprinting to differentiate between a genuine AP and its ET. The following fields are used for fingerprinting:
• Beacon Interval : It illustrates the time between two beacon frame transmissions. The default value is 102.4 milliseconds.
• Capability Information: It contains 14 subfields which represents the required network capabilities which should be fulfilled by a client station, in order to connect to an AP. For example, if the value of Wireless Equivalent Privacy (WEP) flag of an AP is 1, only those clients which also enforces WEP for privacy, are permitted to connect to the AP.
• SSID : It is an alphanumeric string which uniquely recognises an AP in a network. The APs are visible to user by these names. It is a variable length IE whose length lies in the range of 0 − 32 bytes.
• Supported Rates: It is a variable length IE that displays all the mandatory and supported data rates by an AP. An AP must have at least one mandatory rate, and can have multiple supported rates. Any client station that wishes to get connected to an AP must support all mandatory data rates.
• Traffic Indication Map (TIM): TIM field of beacon frame is a variable length IE that represents information about the sleeping client stations with pending frames, and intervals during which the AP attempts to deliver the frames. Every beacon frame does not carry information about buffered frames. An element known as Delivery Traffic Indication Map (DTIM) carries information about the interval between beacon frames before a beacon containing details of buffered frames is transmitted. It varies from AP to AP.
• Country: There are regulatory bodies in every country that impose restrictions in their domains regarding the permitted channels and power levels. It is a variable length IE which specifies the country whose restrictions the AP follows, the permitted channels and the maximum power levels followed by the AP.
• Robust Security Network (RSN): An AP can administer encryption techniques for unicast and multicast traffic in a network. RSN is a variable length IE that demonstrates details about cipher suites used for authentication and encryption. It also defines other RSN capabilities such as authentication key management.
• Extended Support Rates: the beacon frame field known as Supported Rates can only store values for 8 data rates. If any AP wishes to support more than 8 data rates, that information is represented in Extended Support Rates IE.
• Vendor-Specific: It is a variable length IE (up to 252 bytes) which is provisioned to always be present as a last element in the frame body of beacon. This is common for every OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) to put their own proprietary information within the beacon frames.
• The beacon frame also consists of a MAC header. MAC stands for Media Access Control. It is a sub-layer of DLL (Data link layer) in OSI (Open System Interconnect) model. All the components of 802.11 falls under the MAC layer of DLL. All the fields in the MAC header of management frame are mandatory and of fixed length. From the MAC header fields, we have taken in use BSSID field as it signifies the MAC address of the AP to uniquely identify it in a network.
Definition of D2D Attack
"D2D communication is defined as the establishment of link between devices using communication channels (wired or wireless). D2D attack is defined as an exploit where one device (A) launches a malicious activity on another device (B) through the wireless communication channel" [21] . In our case, we consider A to be either an Android device, or a laptop, or a wireless router, and B to be an Android device.
Types of ETs
This classification is based on the type of environment used for creating ETs.
They can be created using the following three methods:
• Hardware: A hardware device such as router can be used to introduce the ET in a network. This is an expensive method, and thus, rarely used by the attackers.
• Software: This is the most prevalent method for introducing ETs in a network. Many open source softwares are available to create ETs using laptops such as hostapd, Connectify, ap-hotspot, aircrack-ng, etc.
• Mobile devices: ETs can be created using tethering facility of smartphones. This is apparently easy than the other methods as it does not require any additional expertise. However, they cater the attackers comparatively less control over the ET, as they allow the attackers to modify very limited number of parameters such as SSID and BSSID. Thus, they are not preferred for specialised ET attacks.
Launching ET Attacks
We have classified ET attack scenarios in a network in three classes on the basis of location of an ET in the network: • Substitution: In this scenario, attacker replaces the genuine AP with the ET at the same location.
• Colocation: In this scenario, attacker colocates the ET near the genuine AP, and transmits stronger signal strength to allure users to connect to them.
• Remote Location: In this scenario, the genuine AP was previously present in the network. Thus, the profile of genuine AP exists in the devices of users. When the attackers introduce ET in this network at any location, users automatically get connected to the ET, due to the saved profile in the devices of users. This scenario is different from Substitution attack scenario in terms of location of the ET, and Colocation attack scenario in terms of the signal strength. In this case, ETs need not to transmit stronger signal strength, and the location of the ETs in the network need not to be same as the genuine AP. Figure 2 describes the three attack scenarios used for launching ET attacks.
ETGuard
This section explains the workflow and methodology of ETGuard to detect ETs in an infrastructure based network.
ETGuard Overview
We present ETGuard, an online, automated, incremental, real-time preassociation analysis tool that accumulates the unique fingerprints of legitimate APs present in a network, and provides a client interface in the form of an Android app to users for effectively scanning the network to detect ETs in realtime. Figure 3 shows the workflow of ETGuard. It consists of the following 7 modules: • Packet Handler: The Packet Handler module collects beacon frames of APs present in the vicinity.
• Extractor: The Packet Handler successively transmits the captured beacon frames to the Extractor. The Extractor module extracts the relevant fields from the beacon frames to construct fingerprints.
• Processing Module: The extracted fields are merged to construct fingerprints for the APs. If any field is not present in an AP, it is substituted by NULL. Further, these fingerprints are transferred to Fingerprint Storage Engine.
• Fingerprint Storage Engine: The fingerprints are matched across the stored fingerprints. If a perfect match is found, the AP is a genuine AP.
The partial matching rules and ET detection is explained in detail in Subsection 4.4.
• Fingerprint Update Engine: If any new AP is found in the vicinity, it gets added in the fingerprint database. Thus, the system is incremental.
Even if any of the beacon frame fields of any genuine AP gets modified, the corresponding fingerprint is updated by this module.
• Deauth: This module broadcasts deauthentication frames for the detected ETs to forcefully disconnect all its associated clients.
The modules of ETGuard are sequenced in time. The architecture of ETGuard consists of two components -server and client. The client side component includes the app interface for users, and server side component handles the beacon frame fingerprinting for a network. Figure 4 shows the sequence diagram of ETGuard in the network. Before associating with any AP, client device sends ET prevents user from associating to ETs in the network.
Server Analysis of ETGuard
In order to detect ETs in a network, we incorporate beacon frame fingerprinting mechanism. The server accommodates the beacon frame fingerprints of legitimate APs. For sniffing ETs, server passively scans the network by capturing the beacon frames on all available channels, and compares it with the stored fingerprints (complete algorithm is explained in Subsection 4.4). Before we explain the functionality of server, we need to answer a few questions:
• Do all fields of beacon frame contribute in ET detection?
• Why beacon frame fingerprinting is efficient in differentiating legitimate AP from the fake ones?
• Do the fields that change dynamically in beacon frames in a real environment can contribute in ET detection?
• If AP and ET belong to the same OEM, can ETGuard detect the fake one?
For the first question, all the fields in beacon frame do not contribute in fingerprinting mechanism of ETGuard, as some of the fields differ from beacon to beacon of an AP in a real network scenario, such as channel information, timestamp values, sequence number, frame check sequence, etc. Only those fields whose values remain constant across all the beacon frames transmitted by an AP are considered for fingerprinting. The fields used for beacon frame fingerprinting are:
BSSID, Beacon Interval, Capability Information, SSID, Supported Rates, TIM, DTIM, Country, RSN, Extended Support Rates, and Vendor-Specific.
Out of the above 11 fields, 6 fields are optional in beacon frame. To judge whether these 6 optional fields of beacon frames are present in the APs of real world or not, we captured the beacon frames of about 50 APs, and created a dataset named MNIT dataset. Since the dataset is prepared by capturing beacon frames of APs from public places (such as railway stations, airports), educational institutions, coffee shops and corporate organisations, therefore, the dataset gives a fair knowledge about the presence of these fields in practical scenarios. By analysing the dataset, we observed that these 6 optional fields are present in 95% of the APs. Table 1 presents the experimental results of 10 APs from the dataset.
For the second question, beacon frame is a frame transmitted by an AP to broadcast its capabilities to clients in a network. The capabilities differ from 
*We have anonymised the names of APs for security purposes.
OEM to OEM for hardware AP, from hardware AP to software AP, from hardware AP to mobile hotspot, and from mobile hotspot to software AP. Following are the arguments for using beacon frame fingerprinting:
• TIM element in the beacon frames is used for buffering data for low-power devices. This is a non-configurable field as it depends on the load of buffered data. We observed that the default TIM element length (when no data is buffered) for beacon frames of mobile hotspot is different than the hardware and software APs. For mobile hotspot the default length is 9, whereas for software and hardware APs, the default length is 4. Since, it is not a configurable field in beacon frames, thus, the difference in the lengths of this element in the beacon frame aids in the detection of ET through mobile hotspots.
• Capability Information element highlights the various capabilities of an AP such as whether an AP can support WEP or not, whether an AP is using block ACK or not, etc. Some of the capabilities are hardware and driver dependent, and could not be modified such as delayed acknowledgement, immediate acknowledgement, use of short preamble, etc. If an ET is created using a software AP or different hardware, capabilities differ.
• Supported Rates element holds different rates for different APs. A hard-ware AP supports more rates as compared to software AP and hotspot.
APs also contain an Extended Support Rates element which contains additional rates supported by an AP. By default, software APs contain less mandatory fields and more Extended Support Rates. However, in hardware APs, extended ones are less and mandatory ones are more. This field is also hardware and driver dependent.
• Vendor-Specific element is different for different OEMs, and present in all hardware APs. It cannot be modified as it contains proprietary information about vendors.
• An attacker can possibly use social engineering to identify the security passphrase for the legitimate AP. If an attacker adopts the similar RSN settings and BSSID as of legitimate one, this will prevent user from directly getting connected to the ET [22] , as two APs with same BSSIDs and security settings on a channel restricts Android device to instantly connect to an AP. Thus, for alluring users to promptly connect to an ET, attacker keeps last digit of BSSID different from the legitimate one.
Hence, beacon frame fingerprinting is an effective technique to recognise an ET in an infrastructure based network. of two APs can never be same, and cannot be forged. Two APs located at two different places will always transmit different signal strengths. However, signal strengths may oscillate due to hazy effects of radio signals [23] . But it always lies in a fixed range. In order to attract users, ETs have to transmit a signal strength higher than the highest signal strength offered by the legitimate AP.
Hence, ETGuard also stores the highest signal strength offered by an AP to justify its legitimacy in case of ET and AP belonging to the same OEM.
Methodology
This subsection algorithmically explains the methodology adopted at the server side of ETGuard for detection of ETs.
Suppose, there is an infrastructure network I n with a legitimate AP named as P . Let the beacon frame of P be denoted as P B . ETGuard fingerprints the hex values of the following fields of P B :
• P SSID : SSID
• P BSSID : BSSID
• P BI : Beacon Interval
• P CI : Capability Information
• P SP R : Supported Rates
• P DT IM : DTIM Period
• P T IM : TIM Length
• P CON : Country
• P ESR : Extended Support Rates
• P RSN : Robust Security Network
• P V EN : Vendor-specific
ETGuard also stores the highest signal strength offered by the AP separately as P SSI 4 . Let the fingerprint of P be represented as P F . The fingerprint of the AP is constructed as:
(1)
For the ETs constructed using software and mobile phones, the fingerprints will be different, and thus, will get detected. Let us discuss a case where an attacker can evade this detection mechanism. Suppose, an attacker introduces a hardware ET of P by using the device of exactly same model and OEM as of P . Let us suppose, a perfect match is found between the fingerprints of P and P ′ as devices of same model and OEM have exactly same hardware and driver values. It then compares the signal strength of the P with the stored value of P SSI . Since ETs attract users by offering higher signal strength than the genuine ones, therefore, the ET gets detected.
Detection Algorithm
Whenever a user requests ETGuard to analyse network for ETs, ETGuard momentarily captures beacon frames and extracts the hex values of various fields. The Radiotap Header (containing information about the SSI field) and header of beacon frame are the first two hex chunks in any beacon frame. They are of fixed length. The fields of beacon frame body are variable in length, and furthermore, they can be present in any order in beacon frame. Therefore, we utilise the IEEE 802.11 unique numerical identifiers for extracting the hex values of these fields. Table 2 displays the identifiers of fields used for detection in ETGuard. After extracting the hex values, Algorithm 1 is applied to detect whether the AP is an ET or not.
ETGuard classifies the AP in three categories:
• Legitimate AP
• an ET Thus, ETGuard is capable of detecting any and every type of ET in an infrastructure based network.
Results and Discussion
We implemented the detection algorithm through a prototype named ETGuard (Evil Twin Guard) to evaluate usability, accuracy and performance of the proposed approach. This section explains the implementation of ETGuard, and describes a case study conducted in our institute to evaluate the efficiency of ETGuard in a real network scenario.
Algorithm 1 Detection Algorithm
D F ← Database of genuine fingerprints
P' is an unregistered AP
8: else

9:
P' is an ET of P
10: else
11:
if P ′ SSI > P SSI then 13:
14: else
15:
P ≡ P ′
Implementation
ETGuard consists of 7 modules (as explained in Section 4). The Request
Handler collects the request of users, and concurrently forwards it to Packet
Handler. The Packet Handler captures beacon frames using tshark[24] on 13 channels of the network in pcap [25] format. Further, the pcap files for all the channels are merged in a single file which is provided as an input to the analysis results are generated in real-time as query processing in mysql database is extremely fast.
Case Study
We conducted a case study in MNIT Jaipur[26] campus network environment to assess the launch of D2D attacks on Android devices, before and after the implementation of ETGuard in the network.
Dataset
We created a fingerprint database for legitimate APs present in the MNIT Jaipur campus using mysql database. The beacon frames are captured using tshark, hex values are extracted using python scripts, and relevant field values are stored in mysql database named eviltwin. We have automated the process of fingerprint generation to remove the manual errors. We have also implemented a Fingerprint Update Module to update the fingerprints and add a new one. Thus, the fingerprinted database is incremental, and can be extended upto a large number of APs.
Experimental Setup
We set up ETGuard under MNIT Jaipur campus network environment on a laptop (ubuntu 14.04) with a wireless network card. of CSE are present in the network. In normal scenario, devices are connected to the legitimate AP, and ETGuard server is waiting for detection requests. In attack scenario, an ET of CSE gets introduced in the network.
Detection
To evaluate the efficacy of ETGuard in detecting ETs in a network, we launch ETs using hardware, software and mobile hotspot in an environment where ETGuard is already present. We analyse the efficiency of ETGuard on the channels supporting IEEE 802.11a/b/g protocols. We introduce an ET named CSE using the similar hardware as of the legitimate one 5 . Thus, the beacon frame values other than BSSID, RSN and SSI are similar by default. We forge the BSSID, do not implement any type of security, and maintain a higher signal strength. As the original AP is using RSN, ETGuard detects the ET. Further, we conduct an experiment with similar security 5 We are not revealing the OEM of AP due to security reasons settings in the ET as of the original one. As mentioned before in Subsection 4.2, if security settings are applied, we need to modify the BSSID for launching attack on the same channel. We modify the last digit of BSSID for performing the attack. Hence, ETGuard identifies the ET using the BSSID field. Next, we maintain the values of RSN and BSSID similar to the legitimate one. However, we are transmitting a greater signal strength for attracting users, and therefore, the ET gets detected by using the SSI field. Hence, ETGuard is capable of detecting ETs belonging to the same hardware.
We introduce the software AP named CSE with the captive portal similar to the original one by using Coovachilli [8] Additionally, we launched ETs using other open source softwares, even if they don't permit the captive portal facility. We created ET of CSE using ap-hotspot [37] , aircrack-ng [38] suite and default unity network manager [39] of ubuntu OS (Operating System). Table 3 specifies the operating system and wireless chipset details that are used for launching ETs in the network. These softwares does not provide a good amount of user control. The configurable fields permitted by these softwares are modified, but still many of the fields differ. Table 4 shows the similar and dissimilar fields of these softwares as compared to the legitimate AP CSE. We can observe from the table that aircrack-ng does not contain many beacon frame fields such as TIM, DTIM, Extended Sup- port Rates and Vendor-Specific. It does not provide user control to modify these fields. One interesting thing to notice is that, DTIM Period of software APs is by default 2. We successfully detected ETs created by the above softwares.
ETGuard is also tested with the ETs administered in the network by means of mobile hotspots. We establish ETs using Android devices of Sony, Motorola, Lenovo and Redmi. We forged the SSID and BSSID of these hotspots. ETGuard successfully identified the ETs in the network, as the the fields in beacon frames of hotspots and the legitimate one differ (as depicted in Table 4 ). Mobile hotspot provides the minimum control to users and therefore, modifications of beacon frame fields is not possible. 
Accuracy
To assess the accuracy of ETGuard, we discuss the false-positives and falsenegatives incurred by ETGuard. In this work, the positive and negative factors are defined as:
• True-Positive (TP): If the AP is genuine, and ETGuard identifies it as a genuine AP, the result is considered as TP.
• False-Positive (FP): If the AP is an ET introduced in the network, and
ETGuard identifies it as a genuine AP, the result is considered as FP.
• True-Negative (TN): If the AP is an ET introduced in the network, and
ETGuard detects it as an ET, the result is considered as TN.
• 
Client App Interface for ETGuard
We provide an app interface for users which on contrary to Android WI-FI settings, displays SSID, BSSID and signal strength of the AP. This app initially sends request to the server for network scanning, and on receiving the response, it refreshes the WI-FI list and highlights the ETs with red color to assist user in connecting with the legitimate AP.
Discussion
ETGuard experiences a delay between receiving the client request and re- of beacon frame, all the other fields used for fingerprinting are network and region independent, and therefore, does not affect the fingerprints, and hence, the deployment.
Comparison with Existing Techniques
We have compared ETGuard with existing state-of-the-art approaches on the basis of various parameters, such as whether the approach could detect an ET before association or not, whether the approach can detect all the three types of The comparison is illustrated in Table 5 . The less the number of filled circle or square ( and respectively) in the row of a particular technique, the more effective the technique is for ET detection. According to Table 5 that ETGuard outperforms the existing approaches for ET detection.
Related Work
In this section, we discuss the existing literature of two realms -D2D attacks on Android and ET detection techniques.
D2D Attacks on Android
Since Android is based on Linux kernel, it inherits Linux kernel features, either without modification, or with slight alteration. As Linux is vulnerable to certain D2D attacks such as MITM, sniffing, replay attacks, etc., Android too becomes susceptible to these attacks. The most recent attack on Android is the Key Reinstallation Attack (KRACK) [45] . This attack exploits the 4-way hand- It takes into account three classes of adversaries -malicious app on the same device, local network attacker and malicious scripts on the web. It conducts entry point analysis, followed by taint analysis and reachability analysis to confirm the vulnerabilities in an app. However, it only handles TCP sockets, and does not consider sensitive information transmission from native layer to java layer.
ET Detection
We classified the existing solutions in two categories -pre-association and post-association. The post-association techniques require connectivity with the AP for the detection of ET, and on the contrary, pre-association techniques are capable of detecting ETs before the connection and transmission of data traffic. does not consider the fact that RSSI values oscillate due to hazy effects, and are not always the same. Unfortunately, the above techniques can only detect ETs created through hardwares. Lanze et al. [42] proposed a dedicated approach for detection of software APs by using Timing Synchronization Functions (TSF).
They recorded the timestamps for beacon transmissions of software APs, and plotted them. According to them, hardware APs always form a linear pattern, whereas, software APs possess outliers. None of the pre-association techniques are suitable for detecting ETs constructed through mobile hotspots.
Post-association
ETSniffer 
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we demonstrate the impact of D2D attacks on Android devices, launched in a network using ETs. We illustrate the launch and adverse effect of the "Invoking Malicious Component" attack on Android. The attack possesses the capability of inflicting an Android device before the connection and transmission of data traffic through an ET. The contemporary ET detection solutions are incapable of preventing this attack because either they analyse an ET after the relay of user traffic through it, or they can detect this attack only for hardware ETs. We propose an automated, online, incremental, fingerprinting based pre-association technique known as ETGuard, which utilises beacon frames to fingerprint an AP. The fingerprints are stored on the server which is requested by the client app installed on an Android device to scan the network for ETs in real-time. The advantages of ETGuard are manifold -it does not need any expertise for deployment, no expensive hardware is used and no protocols are adapted. To assess the performance of ETGuard, we deploy it in real network, and launch ETs using hardware, software and hotspots. ETGuard successfully identifies all scenarios of ET launch with no false negatives, but incurred false positives in one scenario when an attacker substitutes an AP with an ET of exactly same OEM and model, and transmits signal strength similar to that of original AP. In future, we plan to extend ETGuard for handling the Substitution attack scenario for ET and AP belonging to the same OEM. We also plan to offload the detection mechanism on Android devices, instead of following the client-server architecture.
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